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I. Introduction
“Don’t tell me where your priorities are. Show me where
you spend your money and I’ll tell you what they are.”
James W. Frick (University of Notre Dame)
Corporate greed is one of the most persistent and defining buzzwords of our day.1 It is
said to have caused economic crises world-wide, and in one of the more unlikely motion
picture sequels ever to be made, we see Gordon Gekko suggesting: “I once said Greed is
good. Now it seems it’s legal.”2 Legal though it may be, this alleged greed has also given
new thrust to a movement known as CSR, corporate social responsibility (e.g., Bénabou
and Tirole 2010). Firms increasingly care about their reputation and discover the social
purpose of doing commercial business. The “Rise of the Social Enterprise” is seen as
the “Future of the Law” (Timmerman et al. 2011) and a “New Fourth Sector” of social
enterprise forms emerges all over the world (Mickels 2009: 279) – from the United Kingdom
(“community interest companies” since 2005) to Canada’s British Columbia (“community
contribution companies” since 2012), and the US (“benefit corporations” since 2010, see
Plerhoples 2012, Murray 2012; Kanig 2013).3
Despite the attention that these new instruments receive, their behavioral mechanisms
are critically understudied. As a case in point, benefit corporations in the US have been
gradually introduced since 2010 (in Delaware August 2013) on the basis of model legisla-
1 Bookstore shelves are loaded with titles like Pigs at the Trough: How Corporate Greed and Political
Corruption Are Undermining America (A. Huffington 2003), All the Justice Money Can Buy: Corporate
Greed on Trial (S. Prakash 2011), or The Speech: A Historic Filibuster on Corporate Greed and the
Decline of Our Middle Class (B. Sanders 2011). Corporate greed even alerted the legislator, resulting in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (cf. DeCelestino 2006). As an anonymous referee noted, the increased attention
to both corporate greed and corporate social responsibility can easily be traced using n-gram data (see
fig. 2 in the Appendix).
2 “Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps”, a film by Oliver Stone, 20th Century Fox, 2010.
3 In the US, another new vehicle for social entrepreneurship is the “low-profit limited liability company”,
L3C (Murray and Hwang 2011), which is closer in spirit to tax-exempt non-profits under USC § 501(c)(3)
than to traditional corporations (cf. Artz, Gramlich and Porter 2012: 232).
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tion that deviates from classical business corporations in little more than one respect: “A
director of a benefit corporation has a duty to consider the effects of any action or inaction
upon the stakeholders of the benefit corporation.”4 Yet in most other respects, benefit
corporations are the “same as a traditional corporation”5 – in particular, their directors
face the same material incentives as in a classical corporation: They are still elected by
shareholders and accountable exclusively to them.6 With such incentives in a competitive
environment, how effective, as an institution, can the new accountability rule of benefit
corporations be?
To be effective, the accountability rule has to perform two functions: It has to be both
a right and a duty,7 i.e., it has to serve an enabling function – providing “legal protection
to directors for factoring non-financial interests into decisions” (Artz, Gramlich and Porter
2012: 232)8 – as well as a restraining function to make the company “stay mission-driven
[...] by institutionalizing the values, culture, processes, and high standards put in place by
founding entrepreneurs.” (Yvon Chouinard, Founder of Patagonia, see Murray 2013: 486).
Since socially-minded corporations may be hugely profitable (see the case study of Ben &
Jerry’s in Artz, Gramlich and Porter 2012: 232) and since “becoming a benefit corporation
gives a company the opportunity to be more competitive than traditional corporations”
(André 2012: 147), they are attractive even for purely profit-seeking investors, thus en-
4 www.benefitcorp.net/for-directors/what-are-my-duties; § 301 (a) Model Benefit Cor-
poration Legislation (MBCL) at http://benefitcorp.net/storage/documents/Model_Benefit_
Corporation_Legislation.pdf.
5 See Legal FAQs: What is a Delaware Public Benefit Corporation? (www.benefitcorp.net/storage/
documents/Implications_of_Becoming_a_DE_Public_Benefit_Corporation.pdf), p. 1.
6 See www.benefitcorp.net/for-directors/guidance-considering-stakeholder-interests: share-
holders “are listed first, and remain the only stakeholder entitled to bring a legal action”). Other stake-
holders may at best be entitled derivatively by the articles or bylaws, see § 305 (b) (2) MBCL.
7 Similarly, Munch (2012: 195): “The new laws must not only protect these businesses’ pursuit of a dual
missions; they must keep them accountable in both as well.”
8 Without this protection, directors violate their fiduciary duties by considering interests other than
those of shareholders. See the official MBCL comment, p. 14 in http://benefitcorp.net/storage/
documents/Model_Benefit_Corporation_Legislation.pdf. This aspect was previously studied (e.g.,
Greenfield and Kostant 2003), but does “not seem to motivate the average director to move beyond the
shareholder wealth maximization norm” (Murray 2013: 505).
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dangering any informal safeguard to ensure socially-minded management of the company.
So unless directors are restrained effectively, the benefit corporation’s societal vision can
fall prey to managerial “abuse” (Munch 2012: 171) as soon as the first, socially-committed
generation of investors leaves the firm. Probing the restraining function under conditions
of managerial competition is thus a “stress test” for benefit corporation legislation as a
whole.9
Such a test is difficult in the US environment, where benefit corporations are perceived
as a curious novelty and compete with classical corporations. A better environment to
test the underlying behavioral assumptions can be found in Germany, where to some
extent every company is a benefit corporation: German law has always put emphasis
on corporate stakeholders such as employees and creditors, and even outside constituencies
like the “general public” (Jürgens et al. 2000; Fiss and Zajac 2004).10 At least since
1937, German corporation law has held directors accountable for considering the interests
of diverse stakeholders,11 which the German Corporate Governance Code summarizes as
follows:
“The Management Board is responsible for independently managing the enter-
prise in the interest of the enterprise, thus taking into account the interests of
the shareholders, its employees and other stakeholders, with the objective of
sustainable creation of value.” (Sec. 4.1.1 GCGC rev. 2009), where “stake-
9 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this metaphor.
10 This mirrors the more basic understanding of German law that any private property shall be used not
least to advance the common good, as laid down in art. 153 (3) 2 of the Weimar Constitution 1919 and
art. 14 (2) 2 of the Bonn Constitution 1949 (Grundgesetz).
11 Sec. 70 of the Stock Corporation Act 1937 read: “The Management Board has to independently manage
the company as required by the well-being of the enterprise and its workforce and the common good of
populace and Reich.” Despite its conspicuous timing, this was a statement less of Third Reich ideology
than of “a changing economic attitude which had progressively gained popularity since the days after
World War One and which today, more than ever, is a crucial requirement for any business undertaking.”
(Schmidt and Meyer-Landrut 1961: 436). By 1965, legislators considered stakeholder accountability so
intuitive that they no longer saw a need to prescribe it expressly, cf. parliamentary print matter 4/171
(http://dipbt.bundestag.de/doc/btd/04/001/0400171.pdf), p. 121.
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holders” consist of at least “employees, managers, customers, suppliers and the
general public” (Von Werder 2010: par. 353).
This environment strongly resembles the new benefit corporation regime and should thus
provide both valuable experiences and a clean testing ground for the assumption that stake-
holder accountability materially restrains managerial behavior. However, corporate boards
are rich institutional arrangements with intransparent decision-making procedures, which
hinders identification of causation. Board members are also high-profile decision makers
concerned with confidential high-stake decisions, and difficult to engage for behavioral field
research. Therefore, the causal assumption of stakeholder accountability cannot be tested
directly in the field,12 and since we could not find a convincing difference-in-differences ap-
proach, the most suitable research design in the present context is a controlled laboratory
experiment which introduces the corporate decision-making context by imitating its key
features (esp. incentives and framing).
II. Design
As our workhorse we rely on the widely-used dictator game (Forsythe et al. 1994).13
This non-strategic decision environment best reflects the interaction between a corporation
and stakeholders which are not represented in corporate decision-making and have no
immediate bargaining or sanctioning power. Our design therefore departs from Greenfield
and Kostant (2003), where corporate decision-making was seen as a bargaining process and
thus operationalized as an ultimatum game. While this perspective certainly has merit,
12 This could be ameliorated by conducting questionnaire surveys (Adams et al. 2011) or interviews (Manâa
2010). Yet, a concern about causation remains. Furthermore, norms are difficult to evaluate in the field
compared to laboratory settings. See Burks and Krupka (2012) as an example for the elicitation in the
field and Krupka and Weber (2013) as an example for the lab.
13 One participant (the proposer) receives an endowment which she is free to keep for herself or share in
any way she wishes with a second participant (the receiver). As the proposer has no material incentive
to offer any amount, the game is frequently used to measure other-regarding concern.
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it does not address stakeholder value so much as non-myopic shareholder value: In the
ultimatum game, responders have veto power and, therefore, do not resemble powerless
stakeholders. Since the specific value added by stakeholder legislation is to enable corporate
social responsibility towards agents that have no discernible influence in the company, the
dictator game provides an appropriate representation. Put differently: While we do not
believe that stakeholder orientation implies spending corporate money on purposes entirely
unrelated to the corporation’s business, we argue that stakeholder orientation is effective
only if it benefits constituencies which do not demonstrably increase shareholder profits in
return – or else classical fiduciary duties ought to suffice.
We vary our workhorse to create five treatments, which we mention briefly, but explain
thoroughly in the next subsection: The Control serves as a benchmark in which owner-
managers divide a fixed pie between themselves and other stakeholders, represented by
a charitable organization. In four additional treatments this division is decided upon by
hired managers, in a 2× 2-factorial design with variations of incentives (Competition vs.
NoCompetition) and verbal framing which either did or did not include a stakeholder duty
(Stake vs. NoStake). Our experimental design thus unpacks corporate decision-making
by systematically varying the three factors agency, incentives and framing (see Table 1).
With regard to agency and incentives, we were inspired by (but did not exactly replicate)
the experimental paradigm introduced by Hamman et al. (2010).14 With regard to framing,
we used the exact wording of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC), as cited
above. It is widely recognized in experimental economics and social psychology that the
verbal framing of a decision problem plays an important role in decision making (see, e.g.,
discussion in Abbink and Schmidt, 2006). Frames are believed to trigger different norms,
14 This paradigm used competition among agents as an enforcement device for their principal and should
thus provide even more effective enforcement (since it requires no justification and incurs no costs)
than the latent threat of shareholder suits under § 301 (a) MBCL. By supplanting the “right to sue”
with a “right to dismiss”, we thus implemented a more conservative test to obtain an upper bound on
stakeholder interests’ enforcement level.
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create focal points, and affect beliefs or preferences. While the effect of frames has not
yet been tested explicitly in delegation settings, general findings suggest that they should
matter (e.g., Berninghaus et al., 2008). Dufwenberg et al. (2011) theorize that frames
affect beliefs which in turn shape motivation and choices. For our design, these findings
suggest that framing subjects with a GCGC excerpt will affect their belief about norms in
this context, which in turn shapes their own motivation and decisions. Thus, while frames
do not affect fundamental incentives in a strict sense, they are likely to shape motivations
and decisions more indirectly.
II.1. Treatments
Control: Manager owned company
The control is a simple dictator game with three modifications to better approximate a
corporate decision-making environment: First, we applied a business framing by letting
participants act in the role of a “company owner” deciding on an investment that affects
both her company and the “general public”. Second, our frame invoked high stakes by
endowing subjects with 10,000 Taler (at an exchange rate of 800 Taler = 1 Euro) which they
were supposed to allocate in any division of integers between the firm and the general public.
Third, the general public was not modeled by another participant but by a charity to which
donations were made. This best approximated the general public as a stakeholder explicitly
mentioned both in Sec. 4.1.1 GCGC and § 301 (a) MBCL, and made subjects’ behavior
meaningful outside the lab. This modified dictator game is an original contribution to the
literature, designed specifically for the present study.
The dictator game decision was repeated over 10 periods, after which one period was ran-
domly determined and the corresponding allocation implemented. This treatment serves
as a baseline and provides a measure for the degree of subjects’ other-regarding preferences
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in the role of a firm owner facing a charity.
NoCompNoStake: Berle-Means company with entrenched manager
Building on the baseline game, the second treatment introduced an agent into the decision
structure. The agent was framed as a manager whom the company owner, i.e. the sole
shareholder, had to hire by law and who would proceed to make the allocation on the
shareholder’s behalf. We thus implemented a separation of ownership and control, as the
defining feature of corporations in the tradition of Berle and Means (1932). To make this
even more explicit, subjects were informed that
A manager is responsible for independently managing the enterprise. According
to German law, a manager is not bound by the expectations and demands of
the shareholder.
The roles of shareholder and manager were randomly assigned at the beginning of the ex-
periment, and fixed throughout. Each shareholder was partner-matched with one manager
who had to be continually hired over all 10 periods.15 The manager received a fixed wage of
300 Taler for every period, exogenously provided by the experimenter to keep the amount
available for distribution constant between treatments.
This treatment provides a measure for managers’ other-regarding behavior when having
full discretion over a stock of other people’s money. In combination with Control it
allows us to investigate whether subjects in the role of managers, acting on behalf of
the company owners (i.e., shareholders), make the same decisions as the owners would.
Thus, this treatment allows to isolate the effect of introducing agency, with no sanctioning
mechanisms on top.
15 Thus, in the experiments shareholders were forced to explicitly hire the same manager in every period,
to keep our protocol constant across treatments.
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CompNoStake: Berle-Means company with manager market
The third treatment introduced new incentives. Following Hamman et al. (2010), those
incentives took the form of managerial competition: The shareholder still had to delegate
her decisions to a manager, but now she could choose one of three managers who were
competing to be hired. Therefore, our partner-matched groups now contained four mem-
bers: one shareholder and three managers, each identifiable by unique ID. At the beginning
of each of the 10 periods the shareholder had to choose one of the three managers. If a
manager was hired, she received an irrevocable wage of 900 Taler (otherwise nothing) for
this period.16
To elicit the manager decisions, we employed the strategy method (Selten 1967) in a
positional order protocol, i.e. managers decided after the shareholder had made her hiring
decision but before knowing whether they had been hired or not. If a manager was hired,
the corresponding allocation was implemented and disclosed to all group members at the
start of the next period. More specifically, after the first period shareholders were given
a list with all decisions by previously hired managers at the beginning of every round.
Allocations chosen by non-hired managers were not disclosed to anyone. Thus we do not
allow for a competition over wages, but only over decisions in favor of the shareholder. This
resembles the situation outside the lab: Since the decisions of a manager have a higher
impact on the value of a company (i.e., shareholder earnings) than the manager’s wage
does, shareholders certainly pay more attention to the manager’s decisions.
16 This is equal in expected value to the wage in treatment NoCompNoStake, and qualitatively equivalent
to the payment scheme of Hamman et al. (2010: 1830).
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NoCompStake: Stakeholder duty without manager market
In this treatment we introduced a stakeholder duty in the spirit of the German Corporate
Governance Code. The procedure was identical to the one in NoCompNoStake, but
for one very subtle variation: We added a short excerpt from Sec. 4.1.1 of the German
Corporate Governance Code to the paragraph about managers’ duties (italicized here, but
not in the original).
A manager is responsible for independently managing the enterprise. According
to German law, a manager is not bound by the expectations and demands
of the shareholder; rather he “manages the enterprise in the interest of the
stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, employees, customers, general public), with the
objective of sustainable creation of value.” (Sec. 4.1.1 of the German Corporate
Governance Code)
This treatment, in comparison with NoCompNoStake, allows us to isolate the impact
of the non-binding stakeholder provision. Since both our quote from Sec. 4.1.1 GCGC and
our instructions (see the explanations for Control) explicitly mention the general public,
participants should easily see the connection.
CompStake: Stakeholder duty with manager market
Treatment CompStake was identical to CompNoStake, except that the same excerpt
from the German Corporate Governance Code as in NoCompStake was presented to the
participants.
This treatment, in comparison with CompNoStake, allows us to isolate the impact of
the non-binding stakeholder provision under competition among managers. In addition, the
comparison with NoCompStake allows us to investigate whether competition hampers
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the effectiveness of a non-binding stakeholder provision.






























Treatment variables: (5 treatments varying agency, incentives and framing)
Separation of
ownership and control - X X X X
Competition via
manager market - - X - X
Stakeholder duty
present - - - X X
Experiment: (293 subjects in 120 matching groups)
Subjects 33 44 84 44 88
Groups 33 22 21 22 22
Note: Each matching group is one independent observation. In Control, owners decided on their
own, in NoComp-treatments, one manager was paired with one owner and in Comp-treatments,
three managers were paired with one owner.
II.2. Experimental Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the BonnEconLab of the University of Bonn. In total
293 subjects participated in the study. They were randomly invited from a pool of 6,000+
registered subjects via an online-recruiting database ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Out of the
293 participants in our sample, 178 were female (60.75%). Participants ranged in age from
18 to 55 years, with an average age of 22.86 years. With the exception of two, all were either
university students or already had a university degree. In total, 33.79% had a background
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in natural sciences, psychology or medicine, 34.47% in law, politics or economics, and
29.69% in other subjects, including the humanities. 90.1% of the subjects were native
speakers of German, the experiment’s language of instruction. Table 1 gives the number
of independent observations as well as the number of subjects per treatment.
Upon arrival, subjects were seated in separate cabins and received instructions. These
instructions were read aloud, with subsequent control questions being distributed after-
wards. The experiment started only after all subjects had correctly answered all questions.
Subsequent interactions were entirely computer-mediated, through a program developed
in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).17
To avoid confounding the general willingness to donate to a charity with the willingness
to donate to a specific one, we revealed the charity only after all decisions were made.
However subjects were told at the beginning of the experiment that the charity had the
seal of approval by the German Central Institute for Social Issues (DZI), ensuring that the
charity was tested and well-reputed.
After the experiment, subjects answered a questionnaire about socio-demographic details
and motives for their decisions. In addition, all subjects completed the Justice Sensitiv-
ity Questionnaire (Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, and Arbach 2005), with scales for justice
sensitivity from the perspectives of victims, observers, and perpetrators.
Finally, subjects were paid individually for one randomly chosen period. For each subject
in the role of active (chosen) manager, we put the amount that this subject had, in this
round, assigned to charity into a transparent jar.18 The last subject supervised the counting
of the total donation (the accumulated amount in the jar) and the online transfer to charity.
All subjects were informed about this procedure in the instructions. Including instructions,
17 Screenshots of the computer screens are given in the Appendix.
18 We used this jar so that all subjects could see that we actually accumulated charity donations and did
not empty the jar between paying subjects.
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control questions, 10 decision periods, post-questionnaire and payments, each session lasted
between one and two hours with average payments per subject of EUR 10.95 (i.e., about
14-15 USD).
III. Hypotheses
The baseline of our experiment was provided by the Control treatment. The rich experi-
mental literature on dictator games shows that most proposers (on average 64 %) transfer
some non-trivial positive amount (on average 28.3 %) to the receivers (Engel 2010: 588-
9). Our recipient was a charity, which has been shown to increase average redistribution
rates by as much as threefold and to reduce the number of purely selfish subjects (Eckel
and Grossman 1996: 187). On the other hand we applied a business framing which has
been shown to move behavior closer to rational predictions (Arlen et al. 2002). But even
business-framed decision experiments “do suggest some role for such other-regarding pref-
erences, albeit only a weak one.” (Arlen et al. 2002: 32). In our control treatment we
therefore expect positive alas slightly smaller transfers than in standard dictator experi-
ments.
Introducing managers inNoCompNoStake andNoCompStake puts agents in charge
of financial decisions without restraining them to the principals’ interests. In such cases, the
managers can expropriate funds as they see fit (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997: 742). Given
this liberty over corporate funds, managers will likely engage in some mental balancing,
assessing their income relative to that of other corporate stakeholders. In our treatments
without competition, this lateral comparison figured prominently in that agents faced a
secure, fixed wage of 3,000 Taler (10*300) while principals were paid out of a budget of
10,000 Taler from one random round. If agents transferred to the charity as much as senders
usually do in the dictator game (20 to 30 % of their endowment), their principals would
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still be twice as well off as they themselves. However, experimental behavior often reflects
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). An inequality
averse manager would thus want to transfer more than senders in a standard dictator game.
Hypothesis 1: In treatments with entrenched managers, transfers are higher than in treat-
ments with owner-managers (i.e., NoCompNoStake > Control and NoCompStake >
Control).
Moving on from the simple entrenched manager case to one with three competing man-
agers, we turn to Hamman et al. (2010) for an intuition of what to expect. In their treat-
ments with competing agents, transfers initially equaled those in the condition without
competition, but very quickly declined to half of those in the baseline condition (Ham-
man et al. 2010: 1832). Facing a market, managers needed to please the shareholders to
be hired again and thus managers suppressed their own generosity. This was especially
clear in the last round, where transfers exceeded previous ones by far, “driven largely by
several agents [...] choosing to give away all $10 in the final round, when there are no
future possible repercussions from principals.” (Hamman et al. 2010: 1831 fn. 10). Our
CompNoStake and CompStake treatments differ from Hamman et al. (2010) primarily
in terms of framing and the charity recipient. We assumed that this difference would not
change the general pattern, but would merely affect its level.
Hypothesis 2: The manager market aligns the managers’ behavior with the sharehold-
ers’ interests and thus reduces the transfers (i.e., CompStake < NoCompStake and
CompNoStake < NoCompNoStake).
Introducing the stakeholder frame into the treatments with and without the manager
market, we adopted the naïve hypothesis underlying Sec. 4.1.1 GCGC (and the model
legislation on benefit corporations): Stakeholder legislation serves to increase the consid-
eration given to stakeholders. We should therefore expect higher transfers in both of these
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treatments if the legal framing does work at all.
Hypothesis 3: The introduction of the stakeholder duty increases the awareness for the
stakeholders’ concerns and thus transfers (i.e., NoCompStake > NoCompNoStake and
CompStake > CompNoStake).
IV. Results
Table 2 gives the summary statistics for each treatment.19 As expected we observe trans-
fers that are strictly larger than zero in all five treatments. Mean and median transfers
in treatment Control are at 961.61 and 334.5, respectively. Only 8 out of 33 subjects
transferred zero throughout. Conversely, 4 out of 33 subjects transferred more than 2,000
Taler on average.
Table 2.: Summary statistics for transfers (out of an endowment of 10,000)
Treatment Mean Median Std. Dev.
Control 961.61 334.5 1,629.53
NoCompNoStake 5,407.22 6,178 2,983.20
CompNoStake 2,126.04 709 3,203.60
NoCompStake 3,924.54 3,200 2,732.70
CompStake 1,653.51 137 2,910.47
Note: In Comp-treatments we pooled all manager responses from
the strategy method.
Our first hypothesis stated that transfers would be higher if decided upon by an agent
rather than the principal. Testing the mean donations supports this conjecture. Across all
19 For a visualization of the donation distributions see figure 3 in the Appendix. As we will show later
in this section, we observe large end-game effects in some of our treatments. Nevertheless, the relative
ranking of mean donations between treatments is not affected by omitting the last period (Control
978.22; NoCompNoStake 5317.26; CompNoStake 1701.85; NoCompStake 3890.17; CompStake
1150.56).
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periods, transfers in treatments NoCompNoStake and NoCompStake are significantly
higher than in the Control (p < 0.001, two-sided Mann-Whitney u-test).20 Obviously,
subjects in the role of managers prefer higher donations than in the role of manager-owners.
We therefore conclude
Result 1: In treatments with entrenched managers, i.e., NoCompNoStake and NoCompStake,
transfers are higher than in Control.
Our second hypothesis stated that manager competition would lower transfers. This
is also confirmed by Figure 3 in the Appendix and by Table 2: Both treatments with
competition (CompNoStake and CompStake) have significantly lower mean transfers
than their counterparts without competition (NoCompNoStake and NoCompStake)




























Figure 1.: Actual amount (out of 10,000) donated to Charity over time
20 Unless otherwise reported, all non-parametric pairwise comparisons are based on per-firm averages across
all periods.
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Figure 1 demonstrates that this difference is already present in the first period: Transfers
inCompNoStake andCompStake are significantly lower than the ones inNoCompNoStake
and NoCompStake, respectively (p < 0.001 and p < 0.01, two-sided Mann-Whitney u-
tests).21 This indicates that managers perceive a market-induced pressure to comply with
shareholders’ interests. However they initially seem to underestimate this pressure, so that
transfers decrease even further after period 1.22
The hiring patterns that we observe in both Comp-treatments are very similar: Most
shareholders select several different managers over the course of the experiment, and both
the mode and median number of rounds in which a given manager is chosen equals 3.
However, roughly 50% of the time shareholders chose the same manager again, and 16.28%
of the shareholders stick to the same manager throughout the entire experiment.23 What
drives these hiring decisions and how do previous donations influence the probability of
being chosen again? Table 3 shows the results of a mixed effects logit estimation, explaining
whether a manager was selected again by the shareholder. The Variable Donation t−1
denotes the transfer in the previous round by the same manager.24 The results show a
significant selection effect: The more a manager donates, the less likely he will be selected
again.
However, as the coefficients on period and the interaction of lagged donation with period
show, this effect is diminishing over time. With every period, the unconditional probability
of being chosen again increases. Over time, the effect of the lagged donations cancels out.
21 In the first period we included each individual decision in the test, as by virtue of the strategy method
they were all statistically independent. In the following periods they were no longer independent, as
subjects received feedback whether they were selected or not, given their previous decisions.
22 The differences between the treatments with and without competition are significant throughout peri-
ods 2 to 9 (p ≤ 0.001 for comparisons CompNoStake vs. NoCompNoStake and CompStake vs.
NoCompStake, two-sided Mann-Whitney u-tests).
23 For a distributional graph, see figure 4 in the Appendix.
24 Note that the independent variable is lagged and can thus only start with period 2. Results are quali-
tatively the same if we drop the last period or use the sum of all previous donations, refer to tables 5
and 6 in the Appendix.
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Table 3.: Mixed effects logit estimation of the probability of being chosen again
Coeff. Std. error p-value
Constant -.7176 .6537 0.272
Donation t−1 -.00099 *** .0004 0.004
Period .1470 ** .0741 0.047
Donation t−1 × Period .0001 ** .00004 0.027
N = 387, χ2(3) = 20.89, p = 0.0001 ∗ ∗∗
Note: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the manager was chosen
again at t. Data only from managers chosen at (t− 1) in either CompNoStake
or CompStake.25
In period 8 the overall effect is still negative and significantly different from zero (p < 0.05
Wald test) but in the last two periods, 9 and 10, it is no longer significant (p = 0.312 and
p = 0.84 Wald tests).
Since shareholders conditioned their hiring decisions on previous allocations, managers
had an incentive to please them. We do not find any evidence that managers who were
hired often change their transfer decisions over time before the very last period. However,
managers who had continuously not been hired change their intended donations: Stated
transfers of managers increase significantly with every period that they are not chosen
(β=396.58, p<0.0001).26 But even regularly selected managers increased their transfers as
soon as the pressure to comply with the shareholders’ interest vanished: In the last period,
average transfers no longer differed significantly from the ones in the treatments without a
manager market (p > 0.16 for comparisons CompNoStake vs. NoCompNoStake and
CompStake vs. NoCompStake, both two-sided Mann-Whitney u-tests).
Transfers in both competition treatments are therefore u-shaped (see figure 1 above):
26 Coefficient results from regressing the number of rounds previously not chosen on transfers with a random
effect GLS regression, clusters on the group levels.
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They start at moderate levels, decrease over time to significantly lower values and resurge
in the last period, where half of all hired managers transferred the entire 10,000 Taler to
charity. This observation is in line with Hamman et al. (2010) and lends some support to
their interpretation of “agents expressing displeasure at having aided in treating recipients
unfairly in all previous rounds” (Hamman et al. 2000: 1831 fn. 10). We conclude
Result 2: The manager market aligns managers’ behavior with the shareholders’ interests.
When market incentives vanish, managers significantly increase their transfers.
We now turn to the effectiveness of the stakeholder provision. We hypothesized – in line
with the innocent assumption of Sec. 4.1.1 GCGC – that the stakeholder provisions would
have the desired effect, i.e. increase consideration given to the general public, as proxied
by the charity in our experiment.
However there is no significant difference between the two treatments with manager
markets (CompStake vs. CompNoStake), neither overall nor in any single period (p =
0.244 overall, 0.15 < p < 0.99 for individual periods, two-sided Mann-Whitney u-test). This
suggests that the stakeholder duty does not play itself out in the presence of an incentive
to be hired. In fact, except for the last period, our three treatments CompNoStake,
CompStake and Control are statistically indistinguishable (0.12 < p < 0.75, Mann-
Whitney u-test for between-treatment comparisons in all periods except period 10).
More surprisingly, we also observe no positive effect of the stakeholder duty in the treat-
ments without manager market: Transfers to the charity are not higher inNoCompStake
than in NoCompNoStake. In fact there is even an indication of the opposite, since the
mean transfer in treatmentNoCompStake is lower than inNoCompNoStake (Table 4).
Over all periods this difference is close to significant (p = 0.058, two-sided Mann-Whitney
u-test), which holds true for 5 out of 10 individual periods (0.025 ≤ p ≤ 0.083).
We thus conclude
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Result 3: We do not observe that the stakeholder duty increases transfers in our setting.
On the contrary, there seems to be an effect in the opposite direction.
In a final step, we test the robustness of our previous results with parametric analyses
and try to obtain some additional insight into the transfer decisions. Table 4 gives the
estimation results from panel regressions explaining the actual transfers to charity in all
treatments except Control. These estimations support our previous results: Competition
decreases transfers significantly, while the introduction of the stakeholder duty does not
increase transfers: The coefficient for the stakeholder duty is negative in all specifications
and significant in most (Model 1, 2, and 4).27
The panel regression also allows to investigate some developments over time. We ob-
serve a huge and highly significant increase in the last period. Models 2, 3, and 4 show
that this last round effect is limited to the treatments with competition (see the signif-
icant interaction effect Last Period×Competition and the insignificant main effect Last
Period). Furthermore, the estimations confirm that transfers decrease due to competi-
tion (Period×Competition). With competition, managers face the risk of not being hired,
which leads to additional adverse effects: Managers who had repeatedly not been chosen
in previous rounds tended to give significantly higher amounts to charity (NUnemployed).
We can only speculate whether this is caused by frustration, desire for revenge, image
awareness or genuinely stronger concern for charity.
Models 3 and 4 also include a measure for personal sensitivity towards unjust behavior,
as elicited using the Justice Sensitivity Questionnaire.28 As might be expected, being
sensitive to injustice is positively correlated with managers’ transfers.
27 We do observe a positive interaction of stakeholder duty and competition (Stake×Competition), but it
is insignificant and its net effect is negligible, given the negative coefficient for the main effect.
28 We were interested in the justice sensitivity scales from the perspectives of observers and perpetrators.
Since both scales are significantly correlated in our sample (Spearman’s rank correlation, p < 0.001 with
ρ = 0.5855) we generated one overall scale using both perspectives (Cronbach’s α = 0.7609) and used
this for our Justice Sensitivity variable. Our results remain valid if we use only one of the sub-scales.
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Table 4.: Random effects GLS estimation of transfers to charity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Period -9.1 38.6 38.6 38.6
(20.382) (30.330) (30.347) (30.365)
Last Period 1,406.0*** 43.5 43.5 43.5
(244.082) (190.939) (191.049) (191.160)
Stake -541.2* -796.4 -938.9* -1,002.4**
(281.100) (523.539) (506.050) (479.185)
Competition -1,807.2*** -1,753.9*** -2,032.9*** -2,205.2***
(306.049) (432.144) (418.879) (408.586)
Period×Competition -99.4** -193.6*** -192.7***
(38.866) (41.570) (41.703)
Last Period×Competition 2,833.0*** 2,818.4*** 2,818.3***
(390.835) (385.416) (385.829)
Stake×Competition 418.2 576.1 690.8
(611.577) (589.014) (571.585)
N unemployed 494.0*** 487.7***
(81.613) (81.652)






Constant 3,933.8*** 3,935.1*** 1,530.2** 3,753.0***
(284.496) (334.062) (597.147) (1,078.475)
Observations 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,740
Number of subjects 241 241 241 241
Overall R2 0.145 0.166 0.214 0.234
Prob > χ2 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Clusters on group level; robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10;
N unemployed is the number of periods a subject has been unemployed (0 in the first period). Data
only from subjects in the role of active (chosen) manager. 19 managers were never chosen. An
estimation with all data from the strategy method obtains qualitatively similar results (see Table
7 in the Appendix).
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Parametric analyses therefore confirm our previous results, and suggest
Result 4: Transfers increase significantly if managers have a higher justice sensitivity and
if they had been unemployed for a longer period.
As a very last step we turn to the post-questionnaire, which contained various statements
with five-level Likert items (“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”). This questionnaire
provides additional evidence that competition increased the desire of the managers to
please the shareholders. In the treatments with competition, 56% and 67% of the managers
agreed that “During the experiment it was important to me what the other side thought
about me”. In the treatments without competition only 23% and 31% of the managers
agreed with this statement. Overall, managers cared significantly more about the way
they were perceived by the shareholders if competition was present (p > 0.001, two-sided
Mann-Whitney u-test).
In addition we asked whether “Managers felt bound to the expectations of their share-
holders”. Managers should disagree with this statement, since all instructions informed
subjects that “a manager is not bound by the expectations and demands of the share-
holder”. Indeed, in treatments without manager competition most subjects disagreed with
this statement; only 9% or 13% of managers agreed. However, in treatments with manager
competition, those numbers were 53% and 61%, respectively. Thus, subjects in treatments
with competition felt significantly more bound to the expectations of their shareholders (p
< 0.001, two-sided Mann-Whitney u-test).
Result 5: Managers were much more concerned about shareholders’ perception if compe-
tition was present. Based on their perceived incentives they chose to abandon their stated
duties and to conform to the shareholders’ expectations.
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V. Summary and Discussion
We have conducted an experiment to shed light on some determinants of the efficacy of
stakeholder legislation. In a dictator game variant with business framing, subjects were
free to transfer any part of an exogenous endowment to the general public (represented
by a charity) on behalf of their enterprise. In one condition, subjects were framed as
owner-managers, in four others they were shareholders or managers required to take com-
plementary steps towards this decision.
In treatments with one partner-matched manager, transfers to charity were significantly
higher than in the Control with owner-managers. This may be read as a case of agency
costs, which in turn were reduced to almost zero when managers had to compete for their
position. Such competition induced behavior mostly indistinguishable from shareholder
behavior in the absence of managers (subject to an end-game effect in the final repetition).
On the one hand, shareholders hired managers that were less other-regarding, on the other
hand managers conformed consciously to what they (rightly) thought shareholders would
expect.
When additionally prompting managers to pay due consideration to stakeholders such as
the general public—as in Sec. 4.1.1 of the German Corporate Governance Code—this did
not happen. Managers behaved no different in the presence of this duty.29 This even held
if the institutionalized incentive of competition was lacking; if managers responded to the
legal provision at all, they did so by lowering their transfers to charity, leaving the latter in
what was poignantly described as “the cold comfort of transparency without consequence”
(Blount and Offei-Danso 2013: 654).
One potential explanation might be that increasing the salience of stakeholder inter-
29 Similarly, research on voluntary contribution games has shown that moral suasion requires sanctioning
opportunities to sustain cooperation (Dal Bó and Dal Bó 2010).
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ests also increased the salience of shareholder interests. In our experiment managers were
prompted to act in the “interest of the stakeholders [e.g. shareholders, employees, cus-
tomers, general public]” where subjects might have read the order in which the different
constituencies appeared as a ranking of priority. Thus the apparent “stakeholder frame” of
Sec. 4.1.1 GCGC may also be a “shareholder frame”, in that it also emphasizes shareholder
interests.30 This points to the fact that in any given context, it may not be apparent which
reference group a normative framing favors. In our experiment, as in reality, subjects may
construe normative expectations quite differently than expected.
Our study tentatively suggests policy implications for the design of social enterprises such
as benefit corporations. Lawmakers must be careful to consider incentives, and should think
carefully about how to phrase the stakeholder duty. Because of the managers’ incentive
to please shareholders, it might be ill-advised for benefit corporations to empower only
shareholders (see also André 2012). Given that benefit corporations sell a product, they
can be financially successful, so their managers (especially if they are professionals) need
not assume that all shareholders are other-regarding types – especially when investors are
second-generation, without the personal sense of mission that the company’s founders had.
Once profit-interested investors make up part of the company’s base, managers are best off
maximizing shareholder value, just as in a classical corporation without any stakeholder
duty. If potential investors anticipate that, they need not even fear the “benefit” label.
As a consequence, benefit corporations cannot be relied upon as an automated screening
device to effectively select pro-social shareholders. Instead, a company’s vision has to be
institutionalized in specific incentives to enforce the stakeholder duty.31 Therefore, the
30 Also, one might contend that a stakeholder duty does not imply charitable giving, but rather farsighted
investments into the company’s reputation, its home base environment (e.g. improving worker supply
in the future by investing in schools today) or quite generally any measures that benefit the company
in the long run. Yet if stakeholder value was nothing but long-term shareholder value, its raison d’être
were quite questionable. See our argument in Section II.
31 Again, we should highlight the importance of also enabling management to serve societal purposes
(even if pressured by profit-interested shareholders), but this is merely one side of the coin. See our
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incentive structure does deserve more careful attention by policy-makers, lest “the benefit
corporation fails as a useful legal structure because it sets forth a general public benefit
purpose, but provides the parties most affected by this purpose with no corresponding
effective method for enforcing it.” (Blount and Offei-Danso 2013: 669; Munch 2012: 189)
Regarding the stakeholder duty itself, our results shed some doubt on whether such an
appeal will be helpful at all. Maybe stakeholders are better off if directors are not faced
with a list of constituencies in which shareholders feature prominently at the very top
(see Stout, 2012). Perhaps managers should be formally granted full discretion—which
stakeholder duties usually confer upon them anyhow by some catch-all phrase like “other
pertinent factors or the interests of any other group that [the directors] deem appropriate”
(§ 301 (a) (2) MBCL). On the other hand, lawmakers may just want to remind management
that shareholders, too, are stakeholders to be considered. Given the results of our study,
however, such reminders are barely necessary as long as management acts under the threat
of being sanctioned by shareholders, and shareholders only.
Only a number of countries have yet introduced social enterprise forms like the benefit
corporation. Thus the empirical investigation of stakeholder duties is still in its infancy.
Obviously our study can only be a first attempt at empirically analyzing stakeholder du-
ties. While it allows to disentangle different aspects that are inevitably confounded in the
field, it does invite complementary field studies to check the robustness and bolster the
external validity of our findings. It also invites additional studies on the effects of stake-
holder legislation in the presence of endogenous institutional choice. Since shareholders
and managers self-select into benefit corporations, the net effect of stakeholder legislation
may still be positive, even though our study had to abstract from these aspects to effec-
tively isolate the restraining effect we were analyzing. For the time being, our results put
a tentative question mark over the efficacy of “stakeholder” norms which put shareholders
Introduction.
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in first position and are enforced exclusively by them.
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Figure 2.: Occurrences of corporate greed and corporate social responsibility in the cor-






























Figure 4.: Distribution of number of rounds in which managers were chosen in the Comp-
treatments
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Table 5.: Mixed effects logit estimation of the probability of being selected again
Coeff. Std. error p-value
Constant -.6362 .6944 0.360
Donation t−1 -.0010 *** .0003 0.004
Period .1435 .0889 0.106
Donation t−1 × Period .0001 ** .00003 0.024
N = 344, χ2(3) = 17.76, p = 0.0005***
Note: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the manager was chosen
again at t. Data only from managers chosen at (t−1) in either CompNoStake or
CompStake. (Regression replicates table 3 without data from the last period.)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table 6.: Mixed effects logit estimation of the probability of being selected again
Coeff. Std. error p-value
Constant -0.803 *** 0.2729 0.003
PrevDonation -0.0005 *** 0.0001 0.000
Period 0.0382 0.0345 0.268
PrevDonation × Period 0.00003 ** 0.00001 0.022
N = 1161, χ2(2) = 199.34, p = 0.0000***
Note: Dependent variable is an indicator for whether the manager was chosen
again at t. All data from either CompNoStake or CompStake. PrevDonation is
the sum of previous donations from rounds in which the manager was chosen.
(Regression replicates table 3 with complete data.)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 7.: Random effects GLS estimation of transfers to charity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Period 19.8 38.6 38.6 38.6
(21.808) (30.309) (30.321) (30.333)
Last Period 2,316.7*** 43.5 43.5 43.5
(277.177) (190.811) (190.885) (190.959)
Stake -499.0** -796.4 -924.7* -976.2**
(245.439) (523.189) (506.060) (482.709)
Competition -1,804.6*** -2,218.1*** -1,909.4*** -2,061.6***
(292.199) (398.440) (379.452) (368.027)
Period×Competition -28.5 -242.3*** -240.9***
(41.974) (42.577) (42.615)
Last Period×Competition 3,436.3*** 3,385.4*** 3,385.8***
(373.548) (373.182) (373.335)
Stake×Competition 449.7 525.3 608.5
(582.044) (567.286) (550.854)
N unemployed 458.1*** 455.1***
(62.504) (62.447)






Constant 3,662.7*** 3,935.1*** 1,768.8*** 3,633.9***
(287.086) (333.839) (560.019) (1,037.428)
Observations 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,740
Number of subjects 260 260 260 260
Overall R2 0.148 0.174 0.223 0.231
Prob > χ2 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
Clusters on group level; robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10;
N unemployed is the number of periods a subject has been unemployed (0 in the first period). All
responses elicited by strategy method are used.
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Figure 5.: Screenshot: Allocation decision by the manager
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Figure 6.: Screenshot: Selection of a manager
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Instructions Part 1
Welcome to today’s experiment. Depending on your decisions and those of other participants you
will earn money in this experiment. Therefore, it is very important that you read these instructions
carefully. Once all participants have read the instructions you will be asked to answer some control
questions to check whether all the participants have understood the instructions.
During the whole experiment it is prohibited to communicate with other participants. Please raise
your hand and address one of the persons in charge if you have any questions. Any violation of
this rule will result in exclusion from this experiment and all possible payments.
During this experiment all monetary amounts will be given in “Taler”. At the end of the experiment
the total amount of Talers earned will be converted to Euros at the following rate
800 Taler = 1 EURO
The experiment consists of over several rounds. [During this experiment you will interact with other
participants, who will be assigned to you at random. You will, however, receive no information
about their identity; conversely, no participant will receive information about your identity.] or
[In every round you will decide on your own, independent of all other participants.]
In every round you will make a business decision in a role that is yet to be assigned to you. As in
reality, this decision affects both, the company owner’s revenues and the general public. Therefore,
the computer sets up two accounts for each participant: one for the participant himself and one for
the general public (the so-called donation account). Any credit balance on the donation account
will benefit a charitable organisation, which has the seal (“audited and recommended”) of the
German central institute for social questions (Deutsches Zentralinstituts für soziale Fragen, DZI).
At the beginning, both accounts will have a credit balance of 0 Taler. If there is any positive
balance on the donation account at the end of this experiment, we will put the equivalent Euro
amount inside a glass container. The credit balance on your own account will then be converted
to Euros and paid out to you in cash. No participant will be allowed to place additional money
in the container before, during or after the payment takes place.
After the payments, we will make an online bank transfer of the collected donations in the glass
container to the previously mentioned non-profit organization. You are welcome to attend this
process. In any case, we kindly ask the participant in cabin 24 to supervise this transaction.
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Instructions Part 2 (Control)
You will make decisions in the following role:
You are the owner of a company in Germany, which you manage on your own.
You will keep this role for the 10 rounds of the experiment.
Basic Principle
In each round, you split an amount of 10,000 Taler between yourself and the general public. Hence,
you must reduce the amount that could benefit the donation account. Conversely, the more Taler
you allocate to the donation account, the less that flows into your account.
Implementation Details
Each round happens as follows:
You see the decisions made by yourself in the previous rounds (this is not the case for the first
round) and then make a binding decision on how much you would like to assign to your account
as well as to the donation account.
At the end of a round you will receive an overview on your decision.
The experiment ends after 10 rounds have been played. One round will then be chosen at random
and the payments calculated as follows: You receive the amount that you assigned to your own
account in the drawn round.
After each participant has been paid out, we will count the total amount of donations in the glass
container and transfer the money to the non-profit organization.
Instructions Part 2 (NoComp**)
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will assign one out of two possible roles to each
participant at random. The role is then fixed for the rest of the experiment. There will be two
participants interacting with each other at a time. One of them will play the role of a
Shareholder meaning he/she owns a company in Germany. Shareholders must hire a
manager who manages the company under German law for them.
The other will take decisions in the role of a
Manager who is responsible for independently managing the enterprise. According to Ger-
man law, a manager is not bound to the expectations and demands of the shareholder.
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Add the following in Stake [; rather he “manages the enterprise in the interest of the
stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, employees, customers, general public), with the objective of
sustainable creation of value.” (Sec. 4.1.1 of the German Corporate Governance Code)]
In short: the computer will randomly generate groups with two participants each. It will also
assign roles to each group member at random. One group member will act in the role of a
shareholder, while the other will act in the role of a manager. This group and role assignment will
remain the same throughout all rounds and participants keep their name until the end. Thereafter,
the 10 rounds of the game will start.
Basic Principle
In each round, the shareholder hires a manager who splits 10,000 Taler between the shareholder
and the general public. Hence, the manager must reduce the amount that could benefit the
donation account. Conversely, this means that the more Taler allocated to the donation account,
the less that flows into the shareholder’s account.
Implementation Details
Each round happens as follows:
1. The shareholder observes the decisions made by the manager, hired in the previous rounds
(this is not the case for the first round) and hires the manager.
2. The manager sees his decisions made in the previous rounds (this is not the case for the
first round) before making a binding decision about the amount to add to the shareholder’s
account as well as to the donation account.
At the end of each round, everyone will get an overview on the manger’s decision. The experiment
ends after 10 rounds. Then, one round will be randomly chosen and the payments calculated as
follows:
• The shareholder receives the amount allocated to his/her account by the chosen manager
during this round.
• Regardless of the draw the manager receives 300 Taler for each round – the manager’s
decisions have no effect on the amount paid.
After each participant has been paid out, we will count the total amount of donations in the glass
container and transfer the money to the non-profit organization.
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Instructions Part 2 (Comp**)
At the beginning of the experiment, the computer will assign one out of two possible roles to each
participant at random. The role is then fixed for the rest of the experiment. There will be four
participants interacting with each other. One of them will play the role of a
Shareholder meaning he/she owns a company in Germany. Shareholders must hire a
manager who manages the company under German law for them.
The other three will take decisions in the role of a
Manager who is responsible for independently managing the enterprise. According to Ger-
man law, a manager is not bound to the expectations and demands of the shareholder.
Add the following in Stake [; rather he “manages the enterprise in the interest of the
stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, employees, customers, general public), with the objective of
sustainable creation of value.” (Sec. 4.1.1 of the German Corporate Governance Code)]
In short: the computer will randomly generate groups with four participants each. It will also
assign at random the role of the shareholder to one subject and at random to the others to the
roles of the three managers manager 1, manager 2 and manager 3. This group and role assignment
will remain the same throughout all rounds. Managers will also keep their name until the end.
Thereafter, the 10 rounds of the game will start.
Basic Principle
In each round, the shareholder hires a manager who splits 10,000 Taler between the shareholder
and the general public. Hence, the manager must reduce the amount that could benefit the
donation account. Conversely, this means that the more Taler allocated to the donation account,
the less that flows into the shareholder’s account.
Implementation Details
Each round happens as follows:
1. The shareholder observes the decisions made by the managers hired in the previous rounds
(this is not the case for the first round) and hires one of the three managers who has to
decide in this round.
2. At first, the three managers will not receive information on the shareholder’s decision and
everyone decides as if he/she was hired: Everyone sees the decisions made by the managers
hired in the previous rounds (this is not the case for the first round) before making a binding
decision about the amount to add to the shareholder’s account as well as to the donation
account.
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Of the three decisions by the managers only the one of the manager hired by the shareholder is
relevant. At the end of each round, every group member will get an overview of the hired manager
and the manager’s decision.
At the end of each round, everyone will get an overview on which manager was hired and the
manager’s decision. The experiment ends after 10 rounds. Then, one round will be randomly
chosen and the payments calculated as follows:
• The shareholder receives the amount allocated to his/her account by the chosen manager
during this round.
• Regardless of the draw each manager receives 900 Taler for each round in which he/she was
chosen by the shareholder – the manager’s decisions have no effect on the amount paid.
After each participant has been paid out, we will count the total amount of donations in the glass
container and transfer the money to the non-profit organization.
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